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Post-crisis approaches to state intervention: new developmentalism 
or industrial policy as usual? 
 
Abstract: 
 
The 2008 global crisis seems to have radically broken with the prevailing neoliberal ideology and 
practice concerning states’ minimal involvement in the economy. This paper is an essay and a literature 
review on the post-crisis features of ‘industrial policy’-type state interventions. 
We investigate whether crisis-era interventions have given way to neoliberal governments’ more explicit 
stance on industrial policy, once markets have more or less calmed down. We survey the changes that 
had taken place in the global context of state interventions by the time of the outbreak of the crisis, and 
argue that crisis did not provoke any ‘return to the state’. It rather reinforced ongoing approaches to 
industrial policy, or has simply brought states’ prevailing practices to the fore. Though post-crisis state–
market relations in established neoliberal advanced economies have become more similar to those of 
‘statist’ contender states, policy convergence has been limited, since even the pre-crisis years have 
been characterised by non-negligible commonalities. These commonalities, i.e. neoliberal economies’ 
(in particular the U.S.’) substantial interventionism have been largely overlooked before the crisis-
triggered awakening interest in industrial policy.  
The observed modest convergence has been bi-directional, driven by neoliberal states’ inclination to 
devising formal strategies and conversely, by emerging economies’ becoming more familiar with 
intervention practices allowed by international organisations. Common global challenges and increased 
global interconnectedness have also been powerful drivers of convergence. 
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1. Introduction and overview 
 
Following a turbulent period marked by massive state interventions to save the crisis-
ridden global economy from financial collapse and depression, and manage the 
Eurozone crisis, tranquillising financial markets now allow for a cool-minded analysis 
of the role of the state in steering economic development. 
The 2008 global crisis seems to have radically broken with the prevailing 
neoliberal ideology and practice concerning states’ minimal involvement in the 
economy (Clift–Woll, 2012). Government responses to the crisis have gone far 
beyond containment-type monetary and fiscal measures and included egregious 
elements thought as died out for long, such as consumption stimulation, subsidy 
packages; stimulus programmes, bank nationalisation; and bailouts of 
underperforming private, financial and non-financial economic actors threatened by 
bankruptcy. Many of these measures showed remarkable resilience half a decade 
after the breakout of the crisis (Evenett, 2013a; 2013b). 
Emergency measures were coupled with a marked ideological turn, as 
reflected among others by president Obama’s call for the developmental revitalisation 
of the American industry (Kyung-Sup et al., 2012) or by cracks in the conviction of 
determined neoliberal international institutions, such as the IMF (calling for a global 
fiscal stimulus of 2 percent of GDP) or of the World Bank (launching the ‘Competitive 
Industries & Innovation Program’ – Wade, 2012). The reconsideration of past 
ideological convictions was prompted also by the global expansion of some ‘statist’ 
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economies (in particular China, Brazil and Russia) that were less affected by the 
global crisis. 
Consequently, the years that followed the 2008 global crisis were described as 
post-neoliberal transformation in the global political economy (Schmalz–Ebenau, 
2012). Analysts have been uniform in pointing to nation states’ renewed commitment 
to steer economic development.  
This essay investigates the post-crisis features of state interventions. More 
specifically, we will discuss interventions associated with industrial policy, i.e. 
interventions aimed at altering the structure of economic activity toward sectors, 
technologies or tasks that are expected to offer good prospects for national economic 
growth; improve local actors’ competitiveness and enhance national economic 
performance and/or societal welfare (Warwick, 2013). Hence, we do not examine 
macroeconomic policy instruments such as interest rate or exchange rate 
manipulation, irrespective of their contingent potential to influence competitiveness. 
We investigate whether crisis-era interventions have given way to advanced 
economy governments’ (in particular to neoliberal governments’) more explicit stance 
on industrial policy, even after markets have more or less calmed down. We survey 
the changes that had taken place in the global context of state interventions by the 
time of the outbreak of the crisis, and argue that crisis did not provoke any ‘return to 
the state’: it rather reinforced ongoing approaches to industrial policy, or has simply 
brought these attitudes to the fore.  
The rest of this essay is structured in three sections. Section 2 is concerned 
with the changing global context of state interventions and analyses some lessons of 
crisis-era rescue measures. Section 3 discusses post-crisis approaches to and 
instruments of policy interventions. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.  
2. The changing global context of state interventions 
 
By the time of the crisis-induced surge of state activism, major changes had taken 
place in the global context of state interventions. First and foremost, the decline in 
transportation, communication and coordination costs has accelerated a long 
ongoing process: the fragmentation and geographical dispersion of production. The 
global economy has become structured around global value chains (GVCs) (Gereffi–
Fernandez-Stark, 2011), which has made the concepts of ‘domestic’ or ‘national’ 
perceptively elusive (OECD, 2013a). The massive relocation of value adding 
activities to developing countries and in particular the consequent shrinkage of the 
manufacturing sectors in advanced economies provoked outcries for a 
‘manufacturing imperative’ (reviewed by Stöllinger et al., 2013), i.e. for industrial 
policy interventions that enhance the competitiveness of manufacturing. Traditional 
advanced economies have been confronted also with the challenge of shifting end 
markets from the ‘global North’ to selected emerging economies (Cattaneo et al., 
2010; Kaplinsky–Farooki, 2011) and with the global expansion of remarkably efficient 
contender states (van der Pijl, 2012), characterised by direct and systemic industrial 
policies. 
The second major change concerns the transition of the dominant economic 
pattern from industrial to knowledge-based (Dobrinsky, 2009). Accordingly, ongoing 
shifts in the contribution of individual factor inputs to value creation have been 
reinforced, or, at least they have become obvious as a result of the transformed 
global organisation of value adding activities (production fragmentation and offshore 
outsourcing) on the one hand, and due to improved measurement methods (Corrado 
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et al., 2009) on the other hand. Intangible capital was recognised as a key factor of 
growth. Similarly, the fact that the most important drivers of competitiveness are of an 
intangible character has become universally accepted (Garcia-Ayuso, 2003; 
Granstrand, 2000; Peneder, 2000; van Ark, et al. 2009).  
The necessity to revisit both the intervention modalities and the efficiency of 
industrial policy was also underlined by the recognition that GVC-actors’ value 
capture potential is closely associated with intangible activities (Dedrick et al., 2010; 
Mudambi, 2008; Shin et al., 2012). The rising importance of value capture over value 
creation is well-reflected by the surging scholarly and policy interest in the concept of 
the middle-income trap (Kharas and Kohli, 2011; World Bank, 2012).  
Advanced economies are well-positioned to capture value – even at a time of 
the hollowing out of their manufacturing sectors – as reflected by the increasing value 
added to production ratio of their manufacturing firms – documented in UNIDO 
International Yearbooks of Industrial Statistics. Nevertheless, the fact that above and 
beyond manufacturing activities, relatively advanced, value added intensive tasks, in 
particular R&D activities are also being increasingly offshored or outsourced to 
peripheral GVC-participants (Manning et al., 2008; Lewin et al., 2009), requires 
specific strategies that address the related issues.  
Conversely, catching-up middle-income economies are confronting ‘the 
Prebisch–Singer trap of the 21st century’. This concept was advanced by Milberg–
Winkler (2013), who paraphrased the development trap expounded by the two 
classical development economics scholars (Prebisch, 1949; Singer, 1950). According 
to the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, developing countries’ (excessive) specialisation in 
and increasing supply of commodities and agriculture depresses their terms of trade 
and inhibits the structural adjustments (industrialisation) necessary to raise income 
and modernise. In the 21st century, catching-up economies’ export-oriented 
industrialisation confronts similar challenges.1 Though it has seemingly become 
relatively easy to industrialise simply by joining global value chains (Baldwin, 2014), 
the fact that every catching-up economy tries to follow the same export-oriented 
industrialisation strategy by plugging into global value chains at the bottom of the 
smile curve (Mudambi, 2008), equally depresses their terms of trade and prevents 
them from upgrading and raising income. 
These new developments in the world economy, necessitating that states in 
advanced and catching-up economies alike, undertake increasingly complex tasks 
have been obvious already since the early 2000s, but they have come to the fore and 
questioned the prevailing neoliberal refusal of industrial policy only when the financial 
crisis hit the global economy. 
Consequently, beyond the ad hoc fire fighting measures, the global crisis 
prompted governments to reconsider the principles of state intervention and be more 
inclined to devising coherent strategies that aim to enhance economic performance 
(Stiglitz et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of these developments as a post-crisis 
rebound of the activist, developmental state is mistaken: the role of the state has 
never – not even in the era of ‘triumphant neoliberalism’ – been confined to the 
provision of framework conditions (Weiss, 2012). State activism has never receded: it 
rather took different forms while continuously adapting to changing environment and 
new challenges.  
                                            
1
 Interestingly, this claim is advanced just at the time when the downward secular trend of primary 
commodity prices seems to have broken, with a commodity price boom lasting already for more than a 
decade now. 
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Consider the remark, advanced by Weiss (2012) in this respect. Weiss argues 
that advanced economy governments’ current science, technology and innovation 
(STI) policy interventions have much in common with the traditional industrial policy 
approaches that targeted infant industries. Nowadays, “infant industries lie in the 
knowledge-intensive rather than in labour- or capital-intensive sectors [... and these 
industries] do not need old-style tariff protection or export subsidies, [...they rather 
need support in the form of] R&D infrastructure, R&D subsidies, and cost-shared 
partnerships; intellectual property licensing and protection; innovation-led 
procurement targeting new technologies; standard setting; and public sponsorship of 
venture capital funds.” (ibid. pp. 30-31). 
In Cimoli et al.’s (2009, p.26) wording, major developed countries have always 
featured relatively high degrees of intervention. “What primarily differentiates 
developed and developing countries are the instruments, the institutional 
arrangements and the philosophy of interventions.” 
Before elaborating on the post-crisis features of state interventions, some 
paragraphs will be dedicated to the lessons of the crisis-era emergency interventions 
that have been meticulously documented by international organizations (e.g. the 
WTO, OECD, UNCTAD, and the World Bank) and NGOs, e.g. the Global Trade Alert 
(GTA).  
Given that nowadays there are hardly any economic policy measures that do 
not affect international trade, states’ rescue actions have been interpreted as rising 
protectionism – despite the G20 leaders’ much-publicised commitment to a standstill 
on erecting new distortions to global commerce in 2008 (Evenett, 2013a; 2013b; 
Evenett–Fritz, 2010; Evenett–Vines, 2012).  
A key thesis of the literature on rising protectionism is that nowadays, most of 
the top offenders of the global free trade architecture resort to creative, hard-to-detect 
forms of protectionism that are subject to no or to weak WTO rules, including 
bailouts, stimulus packages, ‘buy national provisions’, public procurement, export 
taxes, etc. In fact, during and following the global crisis, it is not overall trade 
restrictiveness measured by traditional indicators that has risen, but rather murky 
protectionism (Kee at al., 2013). This claim is supported by the large gap between 
WTO’s and GTA’s perception of the evolution of trade restrictiveness2 (Evenett–
Wermelinger, 2010).  
The term ‘murky’ is an important finding of these papers in itself, since it 
suggests that various state initiatives (aimed to mitigate the devastating effects of the 
crisis; reignite growth and lower unemployment; improve competitiveness; mitigate 
climate change and encourage green growth; improve energy efficiency, etc.) have 
negative implications for foreign commercial interests without directly violating WTO 
obligations. Two conclusions derive from this recognition. 
Firstly, the claim advanced by Wade (2003) on the constraints imposed by 
WTO membership on the ability of governments to engage in industrial policy ought 
to be revisited. In fact, WTO membership does not seem to radically constrain 
governments’ developmental and protective interventions (Evenett, 2012). 
Secondly, this recognition highlights the extent of interdependence of selected 
policy subsystems e.g. that of industrial policy, investment policy, fiscal policy with 
trade policy. It underscores that there is no such thing as an exclusively domestic 
economy-oriented policy. 
                                            
2
 WTO is much more optimistic than GTA, claiming that the increase of protectionism is negligible. 
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As a matter of fact, the most obvious examples of state intervention during the 
crisis era (subsidies, bailouts, stimulus programmes etc.) were seemingly domestic 
economy-oriented, and not directly related to trade. A recent argument that these two 
phenomena are the two sides of the same coin was advanced by Erixon–Sally 
(2010), advocating that having ‘Keynes at home and Smith abroad’ is practically 
impossible. According to proponents of this Janus-faced policy, “greater government 
macro- and microeconomic interventions are needed at home to stimulate recovery 
and preserve social stability – and thereby prevent a slide into protectionism. But this 
should proceed in tandem with open markets abroad” (Erixon–Sally, 2010: p. 8). 
However, more government intervention at home will necessarily generate 
protectionism at the border – as it happened in the managed trade era of the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
Recent crisis management measures, in particular selected countries’ ‘green 
fiscal stimulus programmes’ have substantiated this claim with new pieces of 
evidence. Consider for example the Clean Energy Package of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which included more than $100 billion investment to 
advance the development and deployment of renewable energy technologies. At the 
end of the day, Chinese producers were among the key beneficiaries of demand-
oriented incentives. For example in the case of solar panels, U.S. producers lost 
substantial part of their domestic market share, and many of them went bankrupt, 
because they could not stand the Chinese competition. These developments, for 
example, the much-discussed Solyndra case have become conspicuous examples of 
the misallocation of public funding. Solyndra, a U.S. solar panel manufacturer had 
benefited from huge loan guarantees, low-interest loans, tax reductions etc. before 
going bankrupt (Rodrik, 2013).  
The dramatic expansion of Chinese solar panel export prompted the U.S. 
government (and similarly the EU) to impose tariffs and antidumping duties on solar 
panels imported from China (Karp–Stevenson, 2012).  
A similar escalation of domestic subsidy provision to discrimination against 
foreign investors was documented by Aggarwal–Evenett (2012) in the wind power 
industry. Following the extension of production tax credits and the introduction of an 
installation tax credit (and various other incentives) enacted in the framework of the 
2008 U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, and of the 2009 American 
Recovery and Reconstruction Act, it was soon discovered, that a large share of the 
radically increased financial assistance to the wind power industry has been captured 
by foreign manufacturers, which provoked significant political pressure for 
discrimination. 
In summary the lessons of crisis interventions have provided empirical 
evidence to substantiate the theoretical claims about the elusive character of 
‘national’ in a world economy structured around GVCs. This, together with other new 
global economic developments made the reconsideration of the philosophy of state 
interventions and the reconfiguration of the applied strategies indispensable. 
Nevertheless, as it will be shown in the subsequent section, approaches to industrial 
policy do not display radical changes. 
 
3. ‘New’ approaches to and new-old instruments of state intervention  
 
Regarding the extent and the depth of the changes in the philosophy of state 
interventions following the devastating years of the crisis and in the substantially 
transformed global environment Michalopoulos–Ng’s (2013) words could be 
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paraphrased. The referred authors argue for a more restrained interpretation of crisis-
era and post-crisis policy practice than what GTA’s alarmist outcries about rising 
protectionism suggest. They claim that far less additional protection has been put in 
place following the 2008 financial crisis compared with what had been feared or what 
had happened in earlier crises. In a similar manner, the alleged new approaches 
(Naudé, 2010a, 2010b; Warwick, 2013) to state interventions are far less new that 
what has been expected: they are rather enhanced versions of past ideologies: no 
turn of the tide can be observed. The employed policy instruments are not really new 
either: at most, the traditional instruments are deployed differently. 
Similarly to past approaches, the legitimacy of state interventions is 
recognised under specific conditions (Aghion et al., 2011), and these conditions do 
not seem to have become broader or more diversified than previously.  
State interventions can be justified provided they address grand societal 
challenges, such as climate change (see e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2012), resource 
shortages, aging, health, urban development, information society, criminality and 
safety and the like (Edler et al., 2012), since these broad challenges require long-run, 
consistent, well-coordinated efforts and the threshold size of necessary investments 
is above the capacity of individual stakeholders. 
Legitimate industrial policies are formulated in a broad, horizontal and 
systemic manner. Broadness refers to the scope of interventions: firm-level 
interventions, strongly related to the oft-used concept of ‘picking winners’ (or to the 
promotion of ‘national champions’) are excluded and even sector-level interventions 
(i.e. ones that target specific sectors) can rarely be justified. Subsidies and other 
incentives should be technology neutral to prevent lock-in and encourage 
competition.  
State interventions have always been considered justified when applied to 
foster technological development (Block, 2008; Soete, 2007). Soete (ibid.) described 
the evolution of policy thinking in this respect. The first milestone of this evolution was 
the transformation of sectoral targeting from low to high-tech sectors, i.e. from a 
defensive support aimed at declining industries to an offensive one, addressing 
strategic sectors that feature increasing returns. In this way intervention target 
‘dynamic growth efficiency instead of static allocative efficiency’. The next milestone 
on the way of industrial policy’s metamorphosis into innovation policy was a more 
systemic formulation of the policy rationale, with emphasis “away from the sectoral 
dimension towards the much broader national institutional framework [...] which 
appeared of crucial importance to the speed, extent and success by which 
innovations got introduced and diffused in the economy.” (ibid. p. 278).  
Authors emphasise that sectoral interventions need to be reconciled with 
competition policy principles (Aghion et al. 2012). Promotional programmes are 
considered effective if they are not directed to established firms, but formulated in a 
way to encourage entry and enhance thereby established firms’ innovation activities. 
Subsidies are legal, if allocated through open competition, and if they are not 
concentrated on one single firm or industry, but rather decentralised and distributed 
over a larger number of firms/industries (Aghion et al., 2011; Buigues–Sekkat, 2011).  
This lengthy enumeration makes analysts recall a catchphrase that 
characterises today’s thinking about industrial policy: it is the ‘how’ rather than the 
‘why’ of industrial policy that matters (Naudé, 2010a; Rodrik, 2009). 
This lesson, namely that the formulation (the labelling) of objectives and of 
intervention instruments is what matters, has been systematically learned by 
emerging and advanced developmental economies: they have a good understanding 
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of what practices are allowed. Consider for example Japan, where already pre-crisis 
industrial policy and its implementing institutions have been reorganised in a way to 
emphasise horizontal rather than sectoral objectives, such as ‘industry 
reorganisation’, ‘human resources’, ‘new industries’, and lately, ‘sustainability’ and 
‘renewable energy resources’ (Nezu, 2007). For example, instead of targeting the 
Japanese automobile industry, interventions aim to foster ‘next-generation transport 
solutions’, ‘new materials’, ‘frontier technologies’ and the ‘deployment of Japanese 
technologies and products in the world market’ (O’Sullivan et al., 2013). 
Or, consider the ‘green fiscal stimulus programmes’ of the crisis years, where 
in most cases the label of ‘sustainability’ was used as a pretext for the 
implementation of selective, targeted developmental programmes (Wermelinger, 
2011). One example is that the temporary state aid granted to ailing automotive 
producers during the 2008-2009 crisis, and particularly the later support schemes, 
were increasingly formulated as ‘green car initiatives’. Examples include the Green 
Vehicle Purchasing Promotion Measure in Japan (Kitano, 2013); the U.S. 
government’s $3 billion cash-for-clunkers programme (Copeland–Kahn, 2013). 
Indeed, green industrial policies comprise several instruments considered as taboo in 
most other contexts, such as direct subsidies, competition distorting regulations, 
purchase of outputs at above-market prices (for example in the framework of 
demonstration programmes), cost-based compensations for producers (feed-in tariffs 
to promote the generation of renewable energy-based power), concessional (below-
market-interest-rate) loans, etc.  
Aşıcı–Bünül (2012) analyse the catchword of ‘Green New Deal’ and contend 
that states have systematically given ‘green colour’ to their economic stabilisation, 
economic recovery and job creation programmes (e.g. in Korea, China or in the 
U.S.), though the green character of some of the targeted sectors or of the 
implemented Green New Deal programmes is rather dubious. 
Regarded from another angle, analysts are of a consensus opinion that some 
countries’ coherent, well-designed, multidimensional green growth strategies can be 
considered a source of competitive advantage and a driver and facilitator of industrial 
restructuring (see Mathews et al. (2011) for China; Capozza (2011) for Japan, and 
Mathews (2012) for Korea). 
Science, technology and innovation (STI) is another field that opens up wide 
opportunities for entrepreneurial states’ (Mazzucato, 2013) developmental activities. 
STI is the field where the boundaries between the universally accepted methods of 
strengthening the national innovation capacity and fostering knowledge-based 
growth, and the unaccepted intervention modalities are rather blurred. Analysing the 
mechanisms of STI policies in the U.S., Block (2008) highlights the systematic and 
developmental character of interventions instead of the alleged prevalence of 
competitive market arrangements (absence of the state). Although STI policy 
measures are referred to as ‘targeted resourcing’, ‘opening windows’, ‘brokering’ and 
‘facilitation’ (Block, ibid.), in reality, STI-specific state interventions are 
developmental, albeit decentralised and distributed among a wide range of 
government departments, innovation agencies; national, regional and local 
development agencies and other organisations, such as national development banks, 
public science foundations, publicly co-financed venture capital organizations etc.. 
Hence, direct government funding is performed in a hidden, decentralised manner, 
which, as Block (2008) noted, makes developmental interventions less conspicuous 
than if they would be carried out by strong, centralised governments. This is why the 
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label of ‘hidden developmental network state’ precisely describes the U.S. approach 
to state intervention. 
As argued by Lazonick–Mazzucato (2013) STI is a primary example of policy 
interventions that socialise the risks of the private sector (the public sector bears the 
highest risks of funding innovation) while at the same time privatising the rewards. 
However, as the example of the civilian aircraft industry demonstrates 
(surveyed by Shin–Li, 2013), global trading partners systematically monitor each 
others’ R&D subsidisation practices and legal disputes over R&D subsidies are on 
the increase. Analysing WTO Panel decisions the referred authors conclude that 
governments should avoid making R&D support policy programmes directly targeted 
towards near-market R&D projects with a high export potential. Moreover, policy 
makers should be careful to use terms such as ‘export promotion’, and refrain from 
devising measures that would explicitly benefit specific industries or firms. 
It is by no surprise that an increasing share of STI-specific interventions are 
formulated so as to promote the universally accepted objective of inter-organisational 
collaboration, conform to the networked structure of today’s innovative activities.3 
State interventions bring technology suppliers and users together, embed private 
sector initiatives in governments’ broad visions (Warwick, 2013) by developing public-
private partnerships and ‘crowding in’ private investments. A diversified range of 
instruments implement the state’s catalysing function, and pool and channel private 
resources for the implementation of specific missions, including publicly financed 
venture capital schemes; loan guarantee schemes; support to science and 
technology parks or to high-tech clusters. 
Another example of exemplary formulation of policy objectives is the case of 
public procurement: an increasingly powerful instrument of state intervention aimed 
to enhance (among others) STI policy objectives. It seemingly pertains to the 
selective approaches to industrial policy, in which the state takes the responsibility of 
selecting among competing technologies and actors. Nevertheless, according to its 
phrasing, public procurement identifies and signals needs; demonstrates the 
usefulness of innovative solutions; facilitates stakeholders’ collaboration and 
enhances thereby the diffusion of new technologies (Georghiou et al., 2014). 
Conversely, if policy objectives and the related instruments deviate from the 
universally accepted formulation, as it happened for example in the case of the 
Chinese indigenous innovation policy or in its strategic standardisation policy, 
international pressure prevents interventions from being long lasting. Chinese 
practice of fostering indigenous innovation,4 in particular the issuing of catalogues of 
products featuring indigenous innovation that receive preferential treatment in 
government procurement processes, has prompted charges of protectionism by 
foreign partners (Boumil, 2011). Some of the most disputed elements of China’s 
‘Indigenous Innovation’ measures have been abolished.5 
                                            
3
 The theoretical underpinning of the states’ role in the STI area is reflected by the ‘Triple Helix’ 
concept (Leydesdorff–Etzkowitz, 1996; 1998; Etzkowitz, 2008). This model advocates the 
collaboration – through market and non-market arrangements – of three actors: firms, universities and 
the state.  
4
 To be accredited as a product of indigenous innovation, the product has to be produced either by an 
enterprise that has both created and registered its IP in China, or by a Chinese enterprise that 
obtained the relevant Chinese IP rights or licenses. (Boumil, ibid. p. 763.)  
5
 China’s international trading partners have been less successful when fighting against China’s 
‘alternative indigenous standards’, that have indeed been used as a protectionist instrument: as a tool 
in commercial negotiations, aimed to lower the royalty rates to be paid to foreign intellectual property 
holders (Breznitz–Murphree, 2013). “In consumer electronics, licensing fees squeeze already thin 
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On the other hand these disputed measures are still applied at provincial or 
local levels (ibid. p. 767). In fact, liberal approaches at the national level frequently go 
hand in hand with the devolution of specific selective and competition distorting policy 
actions to the sub-national level.  
The most conspicuous example is China, where strong provincial and local 
governments have the authority to adopt regulations; set regional standards; impose 
(sometimes discriminatory) taxes; define their own pillar industries (Hearing, 2009); 
provide generous subsidies to local actors and to foreign investors; finance local 
projects; launch R&D support programmes; and erect trade barriers (Feng et al., 
2013; Lin–Milhaupt, 2013; Poncet 2005). However, this phenomenon is not uniquely 
Chinese. As described in MacNeil–Paterson (2012), U.S. states (and not the federal 
level) can be considered the site of green policy intervention: states implement 
subsidies, launch regulatory programmes, and impose standards (e.g. renewable 
portfolio standards differ across states).  
The theoretical underpinning of this phenomenon was expounded by Brenner 
et al. (2010) who argued that in an era of decentralised policymaking, when decision-
making authority is distributed among various levels of government, the nation state 
may not be the adequate unit of analysis of institutional systems. For example, 
neoliberal policies and regulatory practices might be not homogenous within 
individual national territories: sub-national regulatory landscapes might differ from the 
national ones, since policies are implemented in different forms and degrees across 
places, scales and territories. 
In summary, the convergence between advanced economies’ approaches to 
state interventions and those of their dirigiste competitors has been relatively limited. 
Convergence has been bi-directional, driven by neoliberal states’ increased 
inclination to devising formal strategies and conversely by emerging economies’ 
becoming more familiar with intervention practices allowed by international 
organisations. Common global challenges and increased global interconnectedness 
have also been powerful drivers of convergence. Moreover, advanced, emerging and 
catching-up countries systematically monitor their peers’ successful practices in a 
number of industrial policy fields ,(n particular in STI and in green industrial policies, 
and they emulate each others’ practices by setting up similar institutions, devising 
similar support programmes and imposing similar regulations.6 
                                                                                                                                        
profit margins. Development of low-cost and potentially competitive standards for similar or identical 
technology niches pushes foreign standards alliances to lower royalty rates.” (ibid. p. 2). China’s 
practice to establish unique and mandatory standards can be modified only with the adoption of an 
international agreement on standardisation practices. 
6
 Consider the widespread emulation of the U.S. entrepreneurial universities; the setting up of 
technology transfer offices, and of publicly financed venture capital organisations; science and 
technology parks, and institutes of technology. Example of similar regulations is the U.S. Bayh-Dole 
Act that granted the ownership right of intellectual property originating from publicly funded university-
based research to universities. Similar legislation was enacted in several advanced and emerging 
economies (see e.g. Gross (2013) for China; Nezu (2007) for Japan; Stephen (2010) for India).  
As for green industrial policy, most countries employ the same – in some cases quite selective 
instruments, including among others public investment in infrastructure, and in green R&D (thematic, 
mission-oriented research); direct subsidies granted for the absorption and use of green technologies; 
public procurement (e.g. green vehicles); publicly funded demonstration programmes; regulations (e.g. 
renewable portfolio standards, fuel efficiency standards, technological standards, sector-specific 
carbon emission reduction targets); environmental taxes, tax credits (e.g. for investments in energy-
efficiency); accelerated depreciation for green investments; targeted, low-cost financing (through 
green funds, development banks, targeted public venture capital initiatives); loan guarantees for green 
development initiatives; government-sponsored eco-industrial parks; trade restrictions, feed-in tariffs; 
preferential pricing, purchase obligations, or mandated energy reduction targets for specific firms.  
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On the other hand, the claim that the post-crisis convergence of industrial 
policies has been limited refers to the fact that even the pre-crisis years have been 
characterised by non-negligible commonalities. These commonalities, i.e. neoliberal 
economies’ (in particular the U.S.’) substantial developmental interventions have 
been largely overlooked before the crisis-triggered awakening interest in industrial 
policy (Block, 2008; Mazzucato, 2013; Weiss, 2012). 
The convergent practices and multiplying commonalities notwithstanding, the 
path dependence and the necessary customisation of industrial policies hinders an 
excessive homogenisation of the landscape of state interventionism. Given that 
“industrial policies are [...] time-specific and development stage-related” OECD 
(2013: p. 102), multiplying commonalities reflect common challenges and 
developmental states’ successful catching-up performance. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Papers discussing the recent approaches to state intervention advance two recurring 
albeit contradictory remarks. On the one hand, 1) in the era of globally interconnected 
economies (OECD 2013a), with global value adding activities structured around 
GVCs; 2) exposed to global capital markets; 3) constrained by international 
agreements and by the 4) potential exit of multinational companies, which risks an 
exclusion from GVCs – states experience growing limits to national policies that aim 
at shaping growth, improving competitiveness and promoting job creation within 
national borders. 
Conversely, the remark advanced by Bresser Pereira (2010, p.19), stating 
“Despite conventional wisdom, globalization and nation-states are phenomena that 
do not contradict each other but are rather part of a same universe, which is the 
universe of capitalism.” – is unambiguously supported by the empirical evidence of 
state activism in advanced and emerging economies alike.  
Expectations towards states keep increasing and, for sure, today’s challenges 
cannot be met through old-fashioned policy instruments aiming at picking winners. 
States have to be innovative in finding efficient ways to intervene in the economy and 
comply with ever stricter rules of the game. It is by no surprise that cross-cutting 
areas requiring broad-based, multidimensional actions, such as science and 
technology, or green growth and sustainability have become the key targets of 
strategic interventions. These policy fields are showcasing the new trends of state 
interventions: they can propel qualitative growth and structural upgrading and, at the 
same time they offer ample scope for the twin-drivers of effective policy action: 
emulation and innovation. 
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